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Genes and the Just Society 
Preface 
ARTI K. RAI* 
For philosophers influenced by egalitarian ideals, the principle that a just 
society should act to mitigate inequality has long been a bedrock 
assumption.  Even egalitarian theories of justice have, however, generally 
drawn a distinction between two types of inequality, social and natural.  
Many egalitarian theorists have argued that the central type of inequality 
with which society needs to be concerned is social inequality.  In other 
words, if person A is born poor and person B rich, then society should 
strive to redistribute resources from B to A.  Although redistribution does 
not require equalization of wealth, sufficient redistribution should occur 
to ensure that all persons have equal opportunity.  In contrast, egalitarian 
theorists have often seen natural inequalities as relatively fixed and 
hence of more peripheral concern to justice.  Thus, if person A is born 
with great mathematical talent and person B with no such talent, justice 
cannot require that some of B’s mathematical talent be redistributed to A.  
Indeed, it may not even require that B be compensated by A for his lack 
of natural talent. 
In the future, however, the availability of genetic interventions that 
enhance natural abilities may blur the distinction between the social and 
the natural.  This blurring of distinctions is the central issue with which 
the authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice are 
concerned.1  The authors of this book are four distinguished philosophers 
who have achieved particular renown in the field of bioethics.  The 
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authors address what moral obligations we as a society, and as individuals 
within that society, might have in the face of interventions that give us 
“choice” over what was previously “chance.”  The authors’ analysis 
covers a variety of vexing problems, including the following: what 
genetic interventions must, as a matter of distributive justice, be made 
available to all; what types of reproductive decisionmaking may be 
permissible or even required; and what the availability of genetic 
interventions will do with respect to our attitudes towards the disabled. 
 
